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SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOUR
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider theory,
and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of
the law."-Mr Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
DECEIT-REPRESENTATION AS TO VALUE-STATEMENT OF FACT OR OPINION. Jourdan v. Sheets.'
In the case cited above, the plaintiff, who had a $1,100 "equity" in
realty, traded it to the defendant for a jack and three mares. Discovering later that the jack was worthless, and that the mares were worth
from thirty-five to fifty dollars apiece, he sought to rescind, but the defendant refused and the plaintiff brought this action based on fraud and
deceit. It seems that the stock was on a farm about 100 miles distant
from the plaintiff's residence, and the defendant knew that the plaintiff
was in such circumstances that he could not investigate for himself. The
plaintiff relied upon the defendant's statements as to the value of the
stock, and that they were pedigreed animals worth $1,400. The defendant, in order to make plaintiff believe such statements cf value, showed
1. (1923) 248 S. W. 641

(42)
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the plaintiff a bill of sale evidencing that the defendant had recently
purchased the stock for the same price.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff. The point of view was that "a representation even as to the
value may be the basis of an action, if it is made as a fact, and not as the
mere expression of an opinion." The statement of the value was regarded a3 a "fact" in this instance because "the parties did not stand upon an
equal footing, nor did plaintiff have opportunity to examine the property
*
but would have to rely upon what the defendant said in that
regard."2
It is stated to be a well-settled doctrine in this state "that fraud
cannot be based upon mere statements of opinion as distinguished from
representations of fact."
The reasons laid down by some courts why statements which are
mere matters of opinion are not actionable are: (1) "an assertation of
value is, ordinarily, treated as not a fraudulent feature in the make up
of a trade. It is a license each party takes, knowing that the other is not
believing him" . . . . (2) one must use ordinary caution to prevent deception;5 (3) no special confidence is reposed in the representations8
The following statements of value have been held to be mere
statements of opinion, for which the speaker was held not liable: that
bank stock now worth $82 would rise to $100; 7 that "the business would
make a bushel of money a day and similar prophecies and puffs";8 that
a mine would prove equal in value to another mine of great value, the
vendee knowing the mine as yet to be unopened, and its value yet to be
ascertained;9 that certain Alabama land "would produce corn, oats and
cotton and almost all the products of land in the north";o what could be
made out of a certain mine per week and per year;" statement of the

2. There were statements apparently as
to the ages of the animals but the court concluded to attach no importance to them.
3. Stacey v. Robinson (1914) 184 Mo. App.
I. c. 63, 168 S. W. 261; Anderson e. McPike
(1885) 86 Mo. 293.
4. Moody v. Baxter (1912) 167 Mo. App.
521, 152 S. W. 117; Franklin v. Holle (1879)
7 Mo. App. 241.
5.
41.
6.
7.
7 Mo.

McCaw e. O'Malley (1923) 249 S. W.
Langdon v. Green (1872) 49 Mo. 363.
Union National Bank v. Hunt (1879)
App. 42.

8. Black v. Epstein (1902) 93 Mo. App.
459,67 S. W. 736.

9. Fisher. Seitz (1913) 172 Mo. App. 162,
Suter
157 S. W. 883. See, also, Lovelace !v.
(1902) 93 Mo. App. 429, 67 S. W. 737 (a certain bond is just as good as another bond
which was stated to be "A No. 1."; not
actionable); Sawyer v. Horne's etc. Co. (1917)

195 S. W. 537 (certain fox puppies were the
greatest bargain ever offered for $500.00;
not actionable); Files v. Files (1916) 190
S. W. 41.
10. Wilson v. Jackson (1902) 167 Mo.
135, 66 S. W. 972.
11. Kendrick v. Ryus (1909) 225 Mo.
150, 123 S. W. 937.
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money and rental value of certain property even though coupled with a
statement of the price for which the property had previously sold.a
The following statements of value were held to be more than mere
statements of opinion and they were therefore actionable: that the
value of a certain quarter section of land was not less than three thousand dollars, that an offer of eighteen dollars per acre had been made for
ic, and that he never loaned money on land at over one-half its value but
that he had loaned sixteen hundred dollars on this;13 that certain bank
stock was worth four hundred dollars a share coupled with misrepresentations as to the owner of the shares which plaintiff purchased and
the alleged concealed assets of the bank;14 statements of the value of
land and the worth of a certain individual where "plaintiffs had no
means of verifying the statement";15 that a stock of groceries was worth
eight hundred dollars where the parties were not on an equal footing;a
that X-ray apparatus and business were worth $7,500 3ince they "are
not things commonly used by people in general, and there is no evidence
that the defendant by any reasonable investigation could have found out
their value";7 representation that land costing $100 per acre had been
purchased for $200 per acre was a fact when the parties were entering
into a joint enterprise;" s statement of the value of bank stock where the
information was not equally open to both parties;" various representations as to the value and productiveness of land where purchaser did
12.

Cornwall a. McFarland Real Estate

Co. (1899) 150 Mo. 377, 51 S. W. 736 (decision seems questionable; emphasis was
placed on the fact that plaintiff could have
examined the property and formed his own
judgment); Brownlow o. Wollard (1894) 61

Mo. App. 124 (same idea); MeCaw v. O'Malley (1923) 249 S. W. 41 (purchaser made
examination and therefore could not complain of misrepresentations of value, quantity
or previous cost; evidence of representations
not clearly set out); Langdon v. Green (1872)
49 Mo. 363. See, also, Totman v. Christopher
(1922) 237 S. W. 822. Compare Flack v.
Wahl (1916) 197 Mo. App. 10, 193 S. W. 56
(misrepresentation as to rental value held
actionable; purchaser not afforded an opportunity to investigate).
13.

MeBeth v. Craddock (1887)

28 Mo.

App. 380, 1. c. 397 (dictum; land happened
to be located out of the state). See also
Sedgwick a. National Bank of Webb City
(1922) 243 S. W. 893 (dictum that where
mortgagor and property are in another
state "representations as to value are not
regarded as expressions of opinion but of
fact"); Shinnabargerv. Shelton & Lane(1890)

41 Mo. App. 147 (land located in another
state); Brownlee v. Hewi,!t (1876) 1 Mo. App.
360.
14. Davis v. Forman (1910) 229 Mo. 27,
129 S.W. 213.
15. Ruddy v.Gunby (1915) 180S. W. 1043
(similar to the principal case under review).
16. Stones v. Richmond (1886) 21 Mo.
App. 17 (plaintiff inexrerienced, defendant
experienced in grocery business); see also
Cahn v.Reid & Bungard (1885) 18 Mo. App.
115 (plaintiff unacquai:ited with value of
land in another state may recover evern
though he inquired of a real estate dealer as
to the value of the land); Chase v.Rusk (1901),
90 Mo. App. 25 (same idea).
17.

Scheidel Western X-Ray Co. a. Bacon

(1918) 201 S.W. 916.
18. Garrett v. Wannfried (1896) 67 Mo.
App. 437. See also Hiss v.Draffen Eff Co.
(1903) 99 Mo. App. 580.
19. Snider v.Mcltet (1912) 165 Mo. App.
260,147 S. W. 136, s. c. 178 S. W. 484.
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not have a fair opportunity to examine for himself;0 representations as
to value and productiveness of land and the future life of a peach orchard."1
Analogous statements have been held sufficient to sustain a cause
of action.m
In another instance the statement was held to be insufficient.m
Where is the line that divides the decisions? It is not satisfactory
to state that a fraudulent statement of fact is actionable and that a
fraudulent statement of opinion is not. Nor does it help to any great
extent to say that a "mere" statement of opinion cannot be the foundation of an action even though it be fraudulent. There seems to be no
satisfactory distinction between fact and opinion. Most utterances
contain opinion if a fact is that which can be scientifically demonstrated
to the satisfaction of all reasonable men.
The result is, therefore, that the true dividing line is not between
fact and opinion but between opinion that is and is not actionable. This
depends upon what is fraud which cannot be satisfactorily defined.
The result of the attempt to maintain a distinction between fact
and opinion leads the courts to holding that a fraudulent statement of
opinion is actionable if the parties are not on an equal footing, or if one
party did not have an opportunity to investigate. Other exceptions of a
similar nature are made. Under such circumstances the courts are prone
to say that the statement is one of fact and not of opinion. But it would
seem to be obvious that if a statement is one of opinion it is not any less
so because the parties are not on an equal footing or because one does
not have an opportunity to investigate.
20. Slonemetj v. Head (1913) 248 Mo.
243, 154 S. W. 108 (inimitable opinion by
Lamm, J., taking a liberal and sensible point
of view).
21. Wendell v. Ozark Orchard Co. (1918)
200 S. W. 747.
22. Kerwin v. Friedman (1907) 127 Mo.
App. 519, 105 S. W. 1102 (a positive assurance
that title to land in another state was good
an actionable statement of fact and not a
mere exoression of opinion); Rabenau v.
Harrell (1919) 278 Mo. 247, 213 S. W. 92
(that an irrigating system was sufficient to
furnish an adequate amount of water was an
actionable statement of fact); Leicher v.
Keeney (1902) 98 Mo. App. 394, 72 S. W.
145, s. c. 110 Mo. App. 292 (statement of
quantity of land in certain tract); Williamson
v. Harris(1912) 167 Mo. App. 347, 151 S. W.

500 (soil productive without use of commercial fertilizer where purchaser was unfamiliar
with land and seller had used fertilizer for
Mo. App. 595, 152 S. W. 96 (exchange of
several years); Pope v. Florea (1912) 167
property to an old and feeble woman with
poor eyesight); Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Dent
(1906) 121 Mo. App. 108, 98 S. W. 814
(statements of market prices of hardwood
lumber treated as assertions of fact if made to
a person wholly ignorant of the market value
who relied on the speaker's expert knowledge); Judd v. Walker (1908) 215 Mo. 312
(deception as to number of acres in irregular tract).
23. Stacey v. Robinson (1914) 184 Mo.
App. 168 (statement that a certain title was
good because a certain person "wouldn't
have taken it unless it was good").
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It would seem that the futility of distinguishing between fact and
opinion was fully recognized by Lamm, J., in his excellent opinion in
Stonemets v. if-ead. 4 There he wrote: "What is fact and what is mere
opinion is often a close question. The one easily shades of, into the other
or is handmaiden to the other.. . ". He also quoted from Judge Story to
this effect: "It has been suggested at the bar that fraud cannot be
predicated of belief, but only of facts. But this distinction is quite to
'
subtle and refined."25
In this line of cases one frequently meets with the declaration that
a statement in order to be actionable must be one that would have
deceived a person of ordinary prudence and caution. It is submitted
that this doctrine is undesirable. No doubt the courts cannot afford to
waste their time in aiding a person who has relied on absurd and ridiculous statements. But if the action of deceit is for the relit:f of only those
who have exhibited ordinary prudence and caution it would not be
invoked very often. Mr. Stonemets 26 was a naive sort of person who
exercised poor judgment, but he is the type of person who is most in
need of protection from the courts. Lamm, J., has refuted the soundness
of this unfortunate declaration.
The result of the opinion under review is sound but it seems to be
an unnecessary labor to attempt to demonstrate that the statement was
made "as a fact and not as the mere expression of an opinion."
A. N.
24. (1913) 248 Mo. 243, 154 S. W. 108.
See also two good notes in 17 Harv. L. R. 193
and 2S Harv. L. R. 472.
25. Siebhins v. Eddy (1827) 4 Mason, 1. c.

423.

Compare Greenfield v. People (1881)

85 N. Y. 74, 1. c. 82 where ordinary witnesses
were permitted to testify that certain spots
were of blood because their testimony was
fact and not opinion.

26. Ssoemetsr v. Hrad, jupra.
27. Judd v. Walker (1908) 215 Mo. 1. c.
337.
" It has sometimes been loosely said that
the stgligence of the vendee will prevent
recovery for the fraud of the vendor. The
word "negligence", used in that connection,
as we understand its meaning in the law ot
negligence, is an unhappy expression. Fraud

is a wilful, malevolent act directed to perpetrating a wrong to the rights of another.
That such an act in a ve idor should not be
actionable because of the mere negligence or
inadvertence of the vendee in preventing
the fraud, ought to be r either good ethics
nor good law. If one vcluntarily shuts his
eyes when to open them ii to see, such a one
is guilty of an act of folly :indealing at arm's
length with another) to his own injury, and
the affairs of men could iot go on if courts
were being called upon to rip up transactions
of that sort."
See also Sturgis, P. J., in Wendell v. Ozark
Orchard Co. (1918) 200 S. W. 747. "To say
that the ignorant and imprudent must always
act with reasonable prudence is requiring the
impossible."
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EVIDENCE-ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. State Ex Rel Johnson v. Clarke.'
The high degree of industrialization which our country has attained
in the last few decades has caused a removal of the regulation of many
classes of business and professions from the courts to administrative
bodies, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Although these commissions
have now assumed a very imporLant role in administration, the rules
governing their procedure and the reception of evidence are as yet but
little developed.
One of the few cases in Missouri on this subject is that of State ex
rel Johnson v. Clarke, supra. There the State Board of Health had suspended the license of Dr. Johnson for the commission of an abortion,
the chief evidence being the testimony of a witness that the victim told
him that Johnson had committed the deed. The board had also permitted witnesses to testify as to the reputation of Dr. Johnson for committing abortions. It was contended before the Supreme Court of
Missouri that, since the board was merely an administrative body it
might entertain evidence inadmissible in a law court. But that court,
influenced by the value of the right to practice medicine, and what were
thought to be the penal characteristics of the statute,' declared that
jury trial rules of evidence should have been followed.
It seems that the court had two ideas: (1) that even a ministerial
body must observe rules of evidence which prevail with the common law
jury trial, and (2) that the evidence in the proceedings under consideration was not sufficient to justify the action taken by the State Board of
3
Health.
These are distinct problems and should not be confused. A court
may or may not compel an administrative body to follow jury trial rules
of procedure and evidence., Either way it might still quash the judg1. (1921) 288 Mo. 659, 232 S. W. 1031.
2. Revised
7336.

Statutes of Mo.

1919 Sec.

3. The opinion even has this declaration:
"To render a conviction bottomed upon the
veracity and competency of persons other
than witnesses testifying under oath, which
the record here would alone seem to warrant,
would be contrary to the established principlesofalllaw". (Italics supplied)
This statement ignores the fact that in the
most formal and rigid jury trial court a
person could be "convicted" where hearsay
testimony was admitted. There are many
exceptions to the hearsay rule. It seems safe
to say that there are a dozen of them.
Also the statement places undue emphasis

Certainly the declarations
on an "oath".
of Edna Boothby (the victim) would not
have satisfied the jury-trial rules of evidence
even though they were in the form of an
affidavit.
Furthermore, the statement completely
ignores the well known fact that hearsay
testimony is acceptable under those systems
of law which have their heritage in the Roman
system ofjurisprudence.
4. Another distinction is necessary at
this point.
A court might not require an
administrative body to employ jury-trial
rules of evidence and procedure and yet insist that orderly rules be observed in order
that the action taken come witin the due
process clause.
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ment of an administrative body as being arbitrary. Also it might hold
that the judgment was a final and conclusive determination of the facts,
without regard to the procedure or rules of evidence ob!,erved by the
administrative tribunal in arriving at its judgment.
The statute regulating the conduct of the State Board of Health in
revoking licenses makes no provision with regard to the rules of evidence
to be observed by it. It does provide that if the person under investigation fails to appear the board may act "after receiving satisfactory
evidence of the truth of the charges". There is also a provision that in
proceedings before the board depositions may be taken u:nder the rules
as observed in "civil cases".
Nearly twenty years ago the Supreme Court of Missauri delivered
an opinion 5 that gave fair promise of a liberal attitude toward administrative tribunals. There Valliant, J., with concurrence of all the judges
except Marshall, J., (who concurred in the result) argued as follows:
"The State Board of Health is not a court, is not a judicial tribunal; it
can issue no writ, it can try no case, render no judgment; it is merely a
governmental agency, exercising ministerial functions; it may investigate and satisfy itself from such sources of information as may be attainable as to the truth or falsity of charges of misconduct against one
holding one of its certificates, but its investigation does not take on the
form or character of a judicial trial. The law does not contemplate that
the technical rules of evidence applicable to a judicial trial will be
strictly followed or that compulsory attendance of witnesses will be
made. It contemplates that a plain, honest, common sense investigation
shall be made, with good faith and as thorough as may be with the light
of such evidence on either side as is obtainable without process and with
the means at hand; much like the investigation that fair-minded intelligent men would make in their own business concerning the alleged
misconduct of one of their employees, with this difference only, that the
board cannot revoke the license except for cause and after the accused
has had an opportunity to be heard."
Since that opinion was delivered the attitude of the Missouri
Supreme Court has been distinctly illiberal. In State ex rel. v. Robinson
it was held that hearsay testimony "ought not to have :een admitted
or considered" by the State Board of Health which was held to have
improperly suspended for one year a doctor who offered to commit an
abortion. This by crabbed reasoning was held not to be "unprofessional
or dishonorable conduct" under a statute.
5. State tx rel. v. Goodier (1906) 195 Mo.
551.93 S. W. 928. See State Board v. Jordan
(1916) 92 Wash. 234, 158 Pac. 982.

6. (1913) 253 Mo. 27:., 161 S. W. 1169.
See for same sort of rcasoning Board of
Medical Examiners v. Eiren (1912) 61 Ore.
492,123 Pac. 52.
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After this decision, the one under review brings forth no particular
surprise. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that two judges dissented
and that Mr. Wigmore is of the opinion that the decision is unsound.
The dissenting judges probably would have rendered a distinct service
if they had announced the reasons for their views.
In so far as the majority opinion announces that administrative
tribunals must follow jury trial rules of evidence 7 it seems unfortunate.
Half or more of the peoples of the earth administer justice as well as
we do without the restrictions of such rules. Trained lawyers seem to
have indifferent success in following our complicated rules of evidence.
How can a tribunal composed of doctors be expected to follow them?
If the tribunal is composed of lawyers they know how to weigh evidence
without the restrictions that surround a jury. The jury trial rules of
evidence came into existence to control an inexperienced body of men of
average or less than average intelligence. Administrative tribunals are
composed of men of more than average intelligence. They are not casual
bodies. Rather do they function from day to day and they are experienced usually in the exercise of their judgment upon their problems.
It would seem then that the courts should leave them free to follow their
own methods and only check them when their action is arbitrary or irrational as it occasionally will be.s
It is possible that the opinion under review may be justified as
being an arbitrary conclusion without any satisfactory evidence. However, this does not seem to be true to the writer. The declaration of
Edna Boothby was just as convincing as it would have been if it had
been made in a way to have precisely justified its admission before a
jury under an exception to the hearsay rule for dying declarations. As a
mere favor to a defendant in a criminal trial the prosecution cannot
bring forth reputation testimony of his character as an abortionist, for
instance. But it is conceded that hearsay testimony of this sort is admissible before a jury if the defendant offers reputation testimony of his
good character.' Therefore, the testimony is pertinent and worthy of
consideration by a body that is not apt to misuse it. In the case under
review the State Board of Health had both the declaration of Edna
Boothby and the reputation testimony concerning Dr. Johnson. Ajudgment based on this does not seem to be irrational or arbitrary.
The various courts do not agree on the problems discussed above."a
It seems desirable here to call attention to some decisions which have the
same liberal point of view as appears in State ex reL. v. Goodier, supra.
7. Apparently the opinion would apply
as well to jury-trial rules of practice and
procedure.
8. See an excellent opinion by Mason,
J., in Richardon v. Simpson (1913) 88 Kan.

684, 129 Pac. 1128, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 911.
Ed.)
9. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd
secs. 55-58.
10. 17111. L. R. 263; 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(2nd Ed.) seca. 4a-4c.
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Meffert v. Medical Board" is in point. There the Supreme Court of
Kansas made the following observations:
"It is contended that the procedure before the board in the admission and rejection of the evidence was violative of the rig its of Meffert,
in that the evidence received and acted upon was made up largely of unsupported accusations, hearsay and street rumor, and wa:l not sufficient
to sustain the findings. The provisions of the act creating the board
plainly indicate that such investigation was not intended to be carried
on in observance of the technical rules adopted by the courts of law. The
act provides that the board shall be composed of sevln physicians.
These men are not learned in the science of law, and to require of a
board thus composed that its investigations be conducted in conformity
to the technical rules of a common-law court would at once disqualify it
from making any investigation. It is subversive of the morals of the
people and degrading to the medical profession for the state to clothe a
grossly immoral man with authority to enter the homes of her citizens
in the capacity of a physician. It was the intention of the legislature to
adopt a summary proceeding by which the morals of the people and the
dignity of the profession might be protected against such a possibility
without being embarrassed by the technical rules of proceedings at law."
In Lanterman v. 4nderson" a California court of appeals refused to
hold that the board of medical examiners was bound to observe statutory
rules of pleading and evidence before it could revoke a license. Its
reason was that the proceedings was not a criminal one.
The Iowa Supreme Court 13 in the case of a policeman who had been
discharged for burglary declared:
"Whether it could be competent in any case for a civil service
commission to sustain a discharge wholly upon hearsay evidence, we
shall have no occasion to determine. Nor do we have any doubt that
hearsay evidence may be admissible before such commission. The
tribunal is an administrative one. In an appeal to the commission from
an order of discharge by the chief of police, it is permissible to, if not
incumbent upon, the chief of police to disclose the grounds upon which
he acted. This would ordinarily involve information received by him.
Credible information received by the chief of police, implicating members of the force in improper conduct, imposes upon the chief the duty
of investigation and of action. It is not requisite that he should have beit.

(1903)

See also

66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247.

Traer v. Staie Board (1898)

106

12.
625.

(1918) 36 Cal. App. 472, 172 Pac.
Compare Dyment r. Board (1922)

57

Cal. App. 260, 207 Pac. 409. See Suckow. v.
Iowa, 559, 76 N. W. 833 (uncertain); Munk
.4lderson (1920) 182 Cal. 247, 187 Pac. 965.
V.Frink (1908) 81 Neb. 631, 116 N. W. 525,
13. Fronsdahl v.Civil Serv. Com. (1920)
17 L. R. A. (N. S.)439; Freeman v.State
189 Iowa, 1344, 179 N. W. 874. Contrast
Board (1915) 54 Okla.531, 154 Pac. 56, L. R.
A. 1918D. 436.

People ex rd. v. Riley (1922) 232 N. Y. 283,

133 N. E. 891.
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fore him competent evidence, in a technical sense, of the criminal guilt
of a policeman, in order to justify an order of removal. The good of the
public service is the criterion, and this may be seriously impaired by
the conduct less than crime, and such conduct may be proved by evidence insufficient to convict of crime ......
"The hearsay evidence herein set forth disclosed information which
the chief of police had no right to ignore, or to conceal from the civil
service commission. This information and the sources of it were of such
a nature as to call for a denial or an explanation from the plaintiff. He
chose to stand silent. We think this was a circumstance that required
consideration by the commission, and that it was permissible to give to
it the force of substantive evidence. The criminal statute which not
only lays upon the State the burden of proof, but forbids consideration
by the jury of the silence of the defendant, is not applicable, if for no
other reason than that the finding of the commission did not purport to
declare the plaintiff guilty of any crime. Nor was it incumbent upon the
commission to so find."
In State ex rel. v.Truax" the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that
a board of county commissioners in a proceeding to establish a ditch
was not required to place the witnesses under oath:
"The functions of the county board in a ditch proceeding are primarily legislative and only quasi-judicial. The county board is not a
court. Its proceedings are not proceedings in court. They are necessarily informal. The members are usually not lawyers. They are not
governed by legal rules of evidence. The witnesses are usually for the
most part officials, such as engineers and viewers, or parties to the
proceeding. Parties appear usually without attorneys. Their contribution to the proceeding will, in practice, be found to be partly argument
and partly statement of fact. Unless there is some requirement in the
statute to that effect, we think county boards are not required to put
under oath those who appear before them."
This point of view is well stated by a writer in the Harvard Law
Review :
"The elimination of the jury from many judicial proceedings calls
for a readjustment in the law of evidence to meet the modern exigencies
of justice. A pressure for less technical methods of proof is especially
felt in proceedings before administrative tribunals. Coming in response
to an urgent need for a more speedy and efficient administration of
justice, composed of members whose opinions are tempered by the
14. (1918) 139 Minn. 313, 166 N. W. 339.
See also Hopon's .4pptal (1894) 65 Conn.
140,31 Atlantic 531.

15. 36 Harvard Law Review 79. See also
36id. 193,407,585.
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constant stream of cases which come before them, these tribunals may
with safety be entrusted with wider discretion as to the mechanics of
the hearing. Their action should be governed, not by rules, but by a
standard of reasonableness, and the admission of any relevant evidence
of sufficiently probative value, not particularly untrustworthy should
be upheld."
R. C. C.

